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1. Introduction 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the sustainable management of Cameroon's forests has been in crisis. Three sets 
of analyzes have been put forward so far to explain the origin of the crisis. 
First of all, the early analyzes highlighted the inability of successive governments to pursue a real sustainable 
forest management policy, i.e. management that meets the needs of present generations without compromising the 
ability of future generations to satisfy theirs [Brundland G. H. (1998), Lauriol J. (2004), Capul J.Y., Garnier 
(2005)]. Then, other analyzes found that the crisis stems from lack of information concerning the real potential of 
Cameroonian forestry. Finally, other analyzes have rather questioned the fact that the demographic pressure on 
forest resources has intensified. To these relevant factors and for a better understanding of the origins and extent 
of the crisis in the forest sector, it is essential to add bribery as an essential variable for both the severity of the 
destruction and degradation process of the forest, and the difficulties in enforcing the regulations. Adding bribery 
is more than ever relevant because since the beginning of the 1990s, the right to exploit some tree species and not 
others is no longer enforced in accordance with the legal requirements as it used to be. In fact, logging companies 
can now cut off forbidden species once they have bribed public forest controllers. 
Corrupt behaviors have profoundly affected the functioning of the forest sector and continue to play a decisive 
role in how restructuring this sector evolves. In fact, such behaviors have distorting effects on decisions to grant 
forest exploitation licenses, declarations of quality and quantity of trees cut off, the right to cut some species and 
not others, and they continue to influence the movements of tax revenues and the process of paying fines; thus 
interfering with forest conservation strategies and, in turn, biodiversity. 
To understand the impact of bribery, we can base our analysis on the contributions of rent-seeking theory in 
general, and the Mookherjee and P'ng (1995) model in particular; this will enable us to account for the nature of 
the relationship between bribery, forest degeneration and regulation enforcement, and to consider the 
consequences of the strategic interaction between ecosystem-destroying logging companies and corrupt public 
controllers. 
The purpose of this paper is to contribute, in the light of the Mookherjee and P'ng model, to the analysis of 
the phenomenon of bribery and its effects on the crisis of the forestry sector in Cameroon. More precisely on the 
basis of field surveys, the question is whether the Forest System Regulator, namely the Ministry of Environment 
and Forests (MINEF), uses for sustainable management of the forest ecosystem, instruments such as the reward 
rate of public forest controllers, the penalty rates imposed on these public controllers as well as corrupt logging 
companies. 
The rest of the article is structured as follows: the second section presents the teachings of the Mookherjee 
and P'ng model; the third is devoted to the description of bribery in public forest administrations and its impact on 
the sustainable management of forest resources; the fourth is the conclusion. 
 
2. The model  
Trees are important to any society. However, when such a natural resource is abundant, its exploitation gives rise 
to rent-loving behaviors (Leite C., Weidman J, 1999, Aidt, Toke S. 2003, 2009, 2012,). Thus, in a national forest 
management system consisting of a Regulating Ministry and controllers empowered by the Ministry to report on 
forest degradation and/or deforestation due to logging activities, corrupt behaviors can be particularly important 
in forest conservation strategies; and thus, in the preservation of biodiversity. These behaviors will depend in part 
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on the relationships that controllers have with the Regulating Ministry and, on the other hand, on their links with 
logging companies. Mookherjee and P'ng study the interrelations between the actors that are: the regulator, the 
controller and the forest operator. To fully understand these interconnections, we will first set the scene before 
analyzing how bribery occurs.  
 
2.1. Staging the actors 
By cutting down a volume A of forbidden trees, a logging company can avoid the legal provisions that would cost 
C (A). The cost thus avoided is private profit. We assume that C (0) = 0, C (A) is strictly increasing, strictly 
concave and differentiable, and C '(A) = 0 at the point where A = Ã. The volume of forbidden yet actually cut trees 
generates a nuisance h (A) where h (A) is strictly increasing, convex and differentiable and h (0) = 0. Note the 
level of degradation that maximizes the net profit, C (A) - h (A), by A *. 
This first-rank optimum can be socially optimal if the application of the law was costless. 
Generally, A * ≥ 0 where A *> 0 means that it is socially optimal to allow some level of forest degradation. 
According to the law, degradation is subject to a fine fA, (where f is an exogenous and finite rate), and the 
head of the law enforcement agency employs an inspector to implement this regulation. To control the operator 
with an intensity μ, the controller must make an unobservable effort e (μ), where e (μ), is strictly increasing, strictly 
connected and differentiable, and e (0) = 0. This intensity μ [0 , 1¬¬] represents the probability that the controller 
will find out the true level of degradation caused by the logging company A, and successfully prosecute the 
company. With probability 1-μ, the controller will not get any obvious level of degradation. We assume that the 
logging company is aware of what the controller has found. 
The controller has full command of not only the choice of the intensity of his effort, but the level of the 
volume of forbidden, yet actually cut treesÂ,which he reports to the regulator. To motivate the controller, the 
regulator pays him a reward for every dollar of degradation discovered and produced by the logging company. We 
assume that the penalties on the controller for excessive reporting are quite high and that the costs of the logger 
victim of this report are low enough, so that the controller will never be able to make an excessive report, thus, Â 
≤ A. 
The logging company may corrupt the controller to report a lower level of degradation than in reality. By 
doing so, the operator can reduce his fine from fA to f while the controller receives a small reward. In such 
circumstances, we assume that information on bribery and the actual degradation of Operator A will reach the 
regulator with an exogenous probability. The source of the leak of information may be verified by another 
government agency, by the press or employees dissatisfied with the operator. Information leaks reveal bribes paid 
by the operator to the controller. 
In the event that bribery is discovered, the operator must pay not only the amount of the escaped fine, f (A-
Â), but an additional penalty for giving a bribe at the rate pg, making a total of (1 + pg) f (A-Â). 
In case of information leak, the controller must pay a penalty pt(A-) for taking a bribe and undervaluing the 
report. 
To summarize, the regulator's policy consists of three instruments: the reward rate, r, the penalty for taking a 
bribe, pt, and the penalty for giving a bribe, pg. Given the policy (r, pt, pg), the operator and the controller 
simultaneously choose the degradation, A, the intensity of the control, , respectively. Thus, both parties jointly 
determine the bribe, if any;  all parties are supposed to be neutral as far as risk is concerned. 
 
2.2. How bribery occurs 
To begin with, suppose that the operator has degraded the forest to level A and the controller has discovered this 
degradation. We can identify the conditions for which there is a bribe and its amount b. If the logging company 
does not corrupt the controller, it must pay a fine fÂ for the degradation. If it has to pay a bribe and bring the 
controller back to ≤ A, the logging company will pay a small fine to the government. However, with the possibility 
that information leaks and the logging company pays in addition (1 + pg) f (A- Â) to the Regulator. Thus, the 
logging company expects to make 1 gain of [1- (1+ pg)] f (A-) -b of the bribe. 
If the controller refuses bribery, he will receive a rfÂ reward from the regulator. However, if he accepts the 
bribe b and undervalues the degradation in his report, his reward will be smaller, i.e. rf, and with probability  , 
he will suffer a penalty of pt (A-Â). Therefore, the expected gain from undervaluation of the degradation is:b-(rf 
+  pt) (A- Â). 
Bribery is effective only if the logging company and the controller can both benefit. Thus, a necessary and 
sufficient condition for the occurrence of bribery is that [1- (1+ pg)] f>rf +  pt. (I). 
The logging company and the driver are both likely to be corrupt, but the occurrence of bribery is 
endogenously dependent on the regulator's policy. When the bribe is profitable in the sense that politics meets (I), 
we assume that the logging company and the controller choose a report Â to maximize their joined profits,[(1- ) 
(1+pg)] f(A-Â) – (rf +  pt) (A-Â) = [f- f(1 + pg)- rf -  pt](A-Â). 
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With (I), the joined profits are decreasing in Â and so will be maximized for Â = 0 (II). 
The main reason is that the gain in bribery on both sides increases faster with the degree of under-valuation 
than the expected costs in terms of additional penalties. 
Therefore, each time the controller highlights degradation, A, and rejects the bribe, he reports the true level 
of degradation. To make it plain, we assume that in this case, the logging company and the controller agree on the 
bribe that balances their net gains, that is to say: 
[1- (1+pg)] f(A-Â) – b= b – (rf +  pt) (A-Â). 
Taking into account II, this implies that: 
b = ½ { [1- (1+ pg} + r] f +  pt} A   (III) 
What is the effect of this compensation measure as compared to the primary objective of the regulation of 
forest degradation? Condition (III) shows that if the practice of bribe-giving continues, a slight increase in the 
reward of the controller, or a penalty for taking the bribe, pt, will simply increase the level of bribe, so the controller 
will ask for and receive a larger bribe. In such circumstances, bribery increases. 
But if the reward or penalty is sufficiently increased to reverse the relationship (I), bribery could collapse. 
Thus, the demand of the controller increases beyond the good will of the logging company to pay the bribe and 
bribery disappears. If the company does not want to go so far, one way to reduce the bribe is to raise the penalty, 
pg, on the bribe-giver (the logging company), reducing the penalty, pt on the bribe-taker (the controller). This 
contrasts with the usual practice of punishing the bribe-giver less severely than the bribe-taker. 
Analyzing the Mookherjee and P'ng model, Bardhan P. (1997), Mauro, Paolo (1995) states that a higher 
reward will encourage the controller to be more vigilant and dissuade the logging company from degrading the 
forest. To him, reducing degradation will discourage the controller from carrying out checks. At equilibrium, the 
net effect is a reduction of degradation. On the other hand, when the regulator increases the amount of the penalty 
imposed on the controller, the controller is less likely to do his job well. This reduction in controls can lower the 
foreseeable penalty for the degrading logging company, which can aggravate degradation. So, although the 
controller is risk-neutral, the carrot (the reward for mentioning the degradation of the forest in his report) and the 
stick (the fine for accepting a bribe) may produce opposite effects on the level of degradation. This entire 
demonstration is not intended to discourage the establishment of an appropriate premium system in the context of 
bribery, but to highlight the nature of the complexities involved. This analysis also suggests that the reward system 
should be more oriented towards the impact of the nuisance that the regulator is supposed to fight in priority. 
At least two criticisms can be made of the Mookherjee and P'ng model. First, the assumption that the regulator 
is benevolent seems too simplistic because he can be corrupt and even collude with either the controller or the 
logging company. Secondly, it can be assumed that the logging company avoids degrading the forest not only to 
escape the resulting penalty but also to gain a possible reward from the regulator. But beyond these limits, one can 
wonder if the approach to forest management based on the triplet (r, pt, pg) is applied in Cameroon. 
 
3. The empirical analysis 
Before presenting the results of the survey, it is necessary to describe the Cameroonian forest management system. 
 
3.1. The forest management system in Cameroon 
The description of the forest management system will be threefold: the presentation of the forest, the regulatory 
framework for logging, and the activities of logging companies. 
3.1.1. Presentation of the Cameroonian forest 
The Cameroonian forest covers an area of 26 million hectares shared out as follows: 
 Wet dense forest: 17,500,000 ha 
 Degraded forest: 4,500,000 ha 
 Wooded savannah, clear forest gallery: 4 000 000 ha 
Total 26,000,000 ha 
To these types of forests, we can add other groups of plants such as shrub savannas, tree savannas, mangroves, 
etc.). 
The zoning plan adopted by Cameroon in 1994 on fourteen million hectares located in the southern part of 
the dense zone provides for the establishment of a permanent forest estate and a non-permanent forest estate. The 
permanent forest estate1 consists of land permanently allocated to the forest and / or wildlife habitat (e.g. national 
parks and production forests2). The non-permanent forest estate is forest land that can be used for non-forest uses 
 
1 The forest estate includes state forests and communal forests. 
2 Scope for sustained and sustainable production of lumber or any other forest product; hunting, fishing and gathering rights are regulated. 
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(e.g. private forests1, national forest2 and community forests3). In this set of forest domains, we will focus on trees 
that are of particular interest at the national and international levels. 
a) The trees in Cameroon 
Forest inventories carried out by public bodies (formerly CENADEFOR and ONADEF)4 from 1982 to 1999 on 
2/3 of the dense forest area revealed a timber potential of 1.517 billion m3. This volume includes six hundred and 
nineteen ligneous species. Among these species, three hundred are considered marketable in the form of lumber; 
the potential for future stems is estimated at 1.494 billion m3. Among the thirteen (13) most abundant species in 
the zone already inventoried, we can name in order: 
1- Fraké   105 800 000 m3 
2- Ayous      2 500 000 m3 
3- Tali     63 600 000 m3 
4- Dabema    29 300 000 m3 
5- Sapeli   29 200 000 m3 
6- Padouk    27 500 000 m3 
7- Mavingui    16 800 000 m3 
8- Azobé    14 700 000 m3 
9- Bahia     12 200 000 m3 
10- Ekops    11 600 000 m3 
11- Niové    11 500 000 m3 
12- Olong (Bongo)   11 400 000 m3 
13- Eyong      11 200 000 m3 
Total   437 300 000 m3 
The growing potential in current trade is estimated at two hundred and fifty (250) million m3, an average of 
42 m3/ha, including one hundred and ninety-eight (198) million m3 for the thirteen (13) most abundant species. 
All this suggests that sustained and sustainable forest management can be successfully conducted in this area, with 
guarantees of supply to local wood processing industries. It is important to ask why the national and international 
community gives so much value to rainforest trees? 
b) Interest in trees 
As a rule, it can be argued that forests provide five main types of services: they provide habitat, livelihood and a 
way of life for forest dwellers, an environment where a wide variety of animal and plant species coexist, the 
regulation of local and global climatic patterns through evapotranspiration and carbon fixation, soil protection and 
nutrition and, by extension, good watershed management and prevention of desertification and finally wood for 
future uses (World Bank, 1992). 
Cutting trees may result in the loss of these services depending on the circumstances. If the land is converted 
to a different use (eg grazing, food crops or urban development), most of the services rendered by the forest are 
lost. If trees are replanted after felling, or if cutting trees is made highly selective, some or most of the services 
rendered by the forest may remain, depending on the degree of resistance of each type of forest. Humid or dry 
tropical forests, like the forests of Cameroon, provide the five services mentioned above (World Bank, 1992). 
Recent studies, based on remote sensing data and ground surveys, have shown that deforestation, which is currently 
increasing at 17 to 20 million hectares per year, mainly affects tropical rainforests. Deforestation, which includes 
the clearing of forests and isolated trees, is explained by the fact that some people find it interesting. Individuals, 
communities and the companies that are responsible for them vary according to the type of forest. Tree cutting can 
contribute to short-term economic growth and the fight against poverty. But this is often done to the detriment of 
other ecological and social objectives, the costs of which are sometimes borne by the country, sometimes by the 
international community. One can wonder if in the case of Cameroon there is a regulation likely to take these costs 
into account.  
 
3.2. The regulatory framework 
Developed in a general context of liberalization and State disengagement in the productive sector, the Law N° 
94/01 of 20 January 1994 on the Forest, Wildlife and Fisheries Regime, determines the institutions responsible for 
forest management in Cameroon on the one hand, and the conditions and procedures for carrying out this activity 
on the other hand. 
In Cameroon, any natural or legal person wishing to exercise a forest activity must first obtain a logging title. 
With respect to non-profit operations, there is only one type of authorization called "personal cutting authorization", 
 
1 Forests in the national domain are those that do not include yards and agricultural plantations, or secondary woodlots on a farm, or pastoral 
or agro-forestry developments. 
2 Community forests are those whose resource management is done by village communities. 
3 Community forests are those whose resource management is done by village communities. 
4 CENADEFOR: National Center for Forest Development. ONADEF: National Office of Forest Management. 
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whereas for the commercial exploitation of timber, there are 3 of them, namely: 
 The logging license: It is an authorization to exploit well-defined quantities of forest products in a given 
zone. These quantities may not exceed 500m3 of raw wood. Logging licenses for timber are granted after 
consulting a committee for a maximum of one year non-renewable. These licenses apply only to the non-
permanent forest. 
 The sale of firewood: It is an authorization to exploit, for a limited period, a well-stated volume of 
standing wood in an area not exceeding 2500 ha. Timber sale licenses are granted by MINEF, after 
consulting a competent commission, for a maximum period of one year non-renewable for state-owned 
production forests and for a period of three years for the national domain. The sale of firewood applies to 
both permanent and non-permanent forests. 
 The logging agreement: This agreement confers on the beneficiary the right to obtain a given volume of 
timber from a forest concession to supply its wood processing industry in the long term. The forest 
concession is the territory on which the logging agreement is exercised. The forest concession is granted 
after consulting a competent committee. The logging agreement is concluded for a renewable period of 
15 years and applies only to permanent forests. It is evaluated every three years. The total area that can 
be granted to the same forest concessionaire is calculated on the basis of a sustained and sustainable yield 
and the capacity of the existing processing industries to be put in place. In no case may it exceed 200 000 
hectares. 
To obtain one of these logging authorizations, one must be a physical person residing in Cameroon, a legal 
entity whose composition of the social capital is known to the administration in charge of the forests and whose 
headquarters is in Cameroon. 
However, the beneficiary of an accreditation may subcontract some of its activities provided he gets the prior 
agreement of the forest administration. In the context of tree cutting, there are several types of offenses that can 
be divided into two groups: minor offenses and major offenses. Minors are those that are made because we did not 
pay the maximum attention to respect the norms of exploitation contained in the specifications (for example non-
respect of the minimal diameter of the tree to be felled). Major offenses include unauthorized logging or beyond 
the limits granted. 
In all cases, the Law 94-01 on the Forest, Wildlife and Fisheries Regime includes offenses with sanctions, 
some of which are listed below. 
Table  1: Examples of fraud and sanctions. 
Some types of fraud Sanctions 
Harvesting in a forest of the national domain for lucrative use, 
or beyond the period or quantity granted. 
The transfer or hand over of a personal logging permit. 
Fine of 5,000 to 50,000 XAF 1  and 
imprisonment of ten (10) days. 
Exploitation based on a simple permit, unauthorized forest 
products, beyond the limits, the allocated volume and / or the 
period granted in a forest of the national domain, 
Transfer or hand over of a license to another logging company. 
The unauthorized felling of protected trees. 
Fine of 50,000 to 200,000 XAF and 
imprisonment for twenty (20) months. 
Execution of a management or development inventory that does 
not comply with standards set by the forest administration. 
Unauthorized logging in a forest of the national domain beyond 
the limits and / or the period granted. 
The delimitation of logging licenses and actual cutting margins. 
Fraudulent use, counterfeiting or destruction of marks, forestry 
hammers, posts or poles used by forest administrations. 
Fine of 200,000 to 1,000,000XAF and 
imprisonment from one month to six months 
or one of two penalties. 
Logging firewood in a state forest, beyond the limits of cutting 
quotas and / or the period granted. 
Fraudulent exploitation by a subcontractor as part of a 
subcontracting agreement in a state forest. 
Fine of 1,000,000 to 3,000,000XAF and 
imprisonment of six (06) months to one (01) 
year or one of two penalties. 
Unauthorized logging in a state or communal forest. 
Exploitation beyond the limits of the forest concession and/or 
volume and period granted. Transfer of a cut sale or concession 
without authorization. 
Falsification or fraud from any document issued by the forest 
administrations. 
Fine of 3,000,000 to 10,000,000XAF and 
imprisonment of one (01) to three (03) years or 
one of the penalties. 
Source: MINEF. 
 
1 1 EUR = 655.957 XAF. 
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3.1.3. Logging companies and their activities 
The activities of the wood industry are diverse. They include cutting wood, sawing, slicing, carpentry, cabinet 
making, poles, carbonization, etc. 
To date, logging is carried out on about 9 million hectares of productive rain forest. The register of economic 
operators in the forest sector has more than 400 approved operators. 
Among the licensed but inactive operators, there are many national sole proprietorships. 
Out of the 400 companies registered in the Forest Directorate, only 78 are active. There are usually two types of 
forest companies: 
 Unprotected loggers who exploit timber under permits granted to them and sell the raw timber in or 
out of Cameroon. 
 Logging companies with primary processing unit. These are the operators who buy their logs either 
through their own exploitation titles or from other operators. The logs thus obtained are made of 
veneer and sawn timber. 
 
3.2- The results of the investigation 
Before presenting the results themselves, it is important to recall the methodological approach that we adopted. 
3.2.1. The methodology 
This methodology consists in limiting the population to study and making a questionnaire tailor-made for the 
individuals who will be questioned. The main population consists of all participants in the forest management 
process. There are seven types of agents: MINEF controllers, logging companies, territorial and judicial officials, 
law enforcement agencies, non-governmental organizations and finally, the populations benefiting from user rights. 
Indeed, MINEF is the regulator of the forest system in Cameroon. As such, we assume that the wish of MINEF is 
for trees to be exploited according to the rules in force. To achieve this objective, MINEF mandates the controllers 
who supervise the activities of loggers. Both controllers and operators are the main participants in tree management. 
All other participants have a secondary function of support and assistance to the forest administration. In this sense 
the police secure the controllers in their control activities, while the judicial authority ensures the application of 
the cases of repression of some offenses when, for example an operator does not observe the sanctions prescribed 
by the Minister of Environment and Forests. In the end, the population actually surveyed is reduced to forest 
operators and controllers. The activities carried out by the controllers are credited thanks to the observation of the 
Non-Governmental Organizations and in particular Global Witness who participates as a witness in almost all the 
control actions carried out by the central control unit of MINEF. 
The fact that bribery has been one of the most criticized scourges in Cameroonian media in recent days made 
the investigation difficult. This difficulty is due to the fact that respondents did not want to question their morality. 
Also, we avoided asking them if they were themselves bribe-takers or bribe-givers, for fear of increasing the risk 
of no or false answers as most of them did not want to reveal their real identity. We thought fit to get them to give 
their opinion on the corrupt behavior of the other actors of the logging activity which they are supposed to know 
well. To help respondents express their opinions, we provided them with a LIKERT-type scale. It is a scale of 
measurement of the attitudes where the interviewee is asked to place himself on a continuum about a series of 
statements relating in principle to the same subject, and for which he must express his degree of agreement or 
disagreement by choosing between five categories of responses: strongly agree (1 '), somewhat agree (2'), do 
not agree (3 '), disagree (4'), strongly disagree (5 '). At first 78 operators and 110 forest controllers were 
interviewed. In most cases the investigators met with people to interview in their office. The questionnaire was 
often filled in on the spot. At times, the investigator was obliged to come back and collect questionnaires already 
answered. During the counting operation, 62 questionnaires correctly filled in by the operators were validated. As 
concerns controllers 70 questionnaires were validated. We used the SPSS software for data processing. The 
objective of the questionnaires was to find out whether the instrument triplet (r, pt, pg) proposed by Mookherjee 
and P'ng is used by the Ministry of Environment and Forests for a better management of trees in Cameroon. 
Therefore, it was question to ensure the existence of this triplet in Cameroon and possibly measure the existing 
correlations between the various instruments that constitute this triplet. In general, these results can be presented 
according to whether they are from forest controllers or logging companies. We will designate the forest operator, 
forest controller by (e, c); A’ is the absolute frequency of the respondents, R is the valid percentage of these 
respondents. 
3.2.2. The controllers 
The investigation revealed at the level of controllers, the existence of a bribery game (Table 2), the absence of a 
reward depending on the degradation of forests and bribery on the one hand (Table 3), and a penalty for 
underestimating the degradation ratio on the other hand (Table 4). 
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Table  2: Different levels of bribery according to forest controllers. 
Source: Our surveys. 
The answers to the question about whether bribery exists in the labor relationships between logging 
companies and controllers show a general tendency to corrupt practices here and there. Overall, 67.6% (14.7% + 
52.9%) of the controllers surveyed believe that logging companies offer bribes to some of their colleagues while 
only 17.6% (13.2% + 4%) of controllers have a different opinion. For example, through bribery, logging companies 
can cause controllers to underestimate reports on forest degradation. 
Table  3: The different levels of reward of controllers depending on the fines imposed on logging companies. 
(e, c) 
1’ 2’ 3’ 4’ 5’ Total 
A’ R A’ R A’ R A’ R A’ R A’ R 
Bribery by gifts 4 5.8 2 2.9 1 1.4 18 26.1 44 63.8 68 100 
Source: Our surveys. 
Table 3 shows us that 89.9% of controllers surveyed say they do not benefit from a reward depending on the 
fines that accomplices pay for having degraded the forest, while 8.7% admit to benefit. 
Table 4: The different levels of penalties imposed on the controller who is corrupted by a logging company. 
(e, c) 
1’ 2’ 3’ 4’ 5’ Total 
A’ R A’ R A’ R A’ R A’ R A’ R 
Controllers interviewed 4 5.8 2 2.9 1 1.4 15 21.7 46 66.7 66 100 
Source: Our surveys. 
The surveys also examined whether the Department often imposes penalties on controllers who, in collusion 
with the logging company, underestimate the level of forest degradation. Table n ° 3 above indicates that for 88.4% 
of the controllers interviewed, there are no penalties against some of their colleagues who are corrupt and 
underestimate, bias or falsify reports on forest degradation. On the other hand, there are administrative sanctions 
against unscrupulous controllers. These are usually disciplinary transfers to remote localities, blames and warnings. 
It may happen on rare occasions that the civil servant loses his position as controller. The Law No. 94-01 of 20 
January 1994 on forestry, wildlife and fisheries provides in Article 150 that accomplices, or all those who have 
participated in one way or another in offense are punishable by the same penalties as the author of the offense. The 
consequence is that the corrupt controller should for example pay the same fine as the offending operator. 
Investigations show that this law is not applied, at least on the side of controllers. But if it were applied, could civil 
servants pay fines as high as those paid by logging companies? For example: the perpetrator of any of the following 
infringements is punished with a fine of three to ten million XAF and an imprisonment term of one to three years, 
or one of the two penalties only: 
 Unauthorized logging in a public or communal forest; 
 Logging beyond the limits of the forest concession and / or the volume and the period granted. 
Table 5: The reward received by a controller based on the auction sale of confiscated logs. 
Source: Our surveys. 
The table above shows that controllers (20% + 47, 1% = 67.1%) receive bonuses resulting from the auctioning 
of timber logs owned by logging companies that have committed an infringement. However, interviews with non-
controllers of MINEF staff revealed that all of them benefited from these bonuses. The bonuses cannot therefore 
be a particular incentive for controllers who make objective and reliable reports on forest degradation by logging 
companies. In fact, these controllers believe that they should be the ultimate beneficiaries; extending the sharing 
of bonuses to staff members who are not controllers (or even to unscrupulous controllers) has the effect of reducing 
the share received by each of them. 
In the light of all this information, it can be said that the forest management system regulator in Cameroon 
(MINEF) has neither a reward rate (r) nor a penalty rate (pt) in the sense of Mookherjee and P 'ng. The fact that 
this regulator does not have these instruments can appear as one of the essential causes of the anarchic exploitation 
of forests and thus of their sustainable management crisis. What about logging companies? 
3.2.3. Forestry operators 
The survey revealed at the level of logging companies, the existence of a bribe game (Table 6) and the absence of 
penalties relating to this game (Table 7). 
 (e, c) 
1’ 2’ 3’ 4’ 5’ Total 
A’ R A’ R A’ R A’ R A’ R A’ R 
Bribery by gifts 10 14.5 5 7.2 44 63.8 6 8.7 4 5.8 69  
Bribery by money 10 14.7 36 52.9 10 14.7 9 13.2 3 4.4  100 
(e, c) 
1’ 2’ 3’ 4’ 5’ Total 
A’ R A’ R A’ R A’ R A’ R A’ R 
Controllers interviewed 14 20 33 47.1 1 1.4 13 18.9 9 12.9 70 100 
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1’ 2’ 3’ 4’ 5’ Total 
A’ R A’ R A’ R A’ R A’ R A’ R 
Usual bribe 16 27.1 41 69.1 1 1.7 1 1.7   59 100 
Bribe known in advance 37 60.7 19 31.7 1 1.6 4 6.6   61 100 
Effective bribe 26 45.6 30 52.6 1 1.8     57 100 
Bribe in fear of paying more 23 39 24 40.7 6 10.2 6 10.2   59 100 
Bribe paid in several stages 23 39.7 32 55.2 3 5.2     58 100 
Bribe canceling the offense 27 45 25 41.7 4 6.7 4 6.7   60 100 
Bribe as the logger’s pass 47 77 14 23       61 100 
Source: Our surveys. 
Reading Table 6 essentially shows that the overwhelming majority admit the existence of a bribe game in 
their sector of activity. Indeed, 96.6% of logging companies believe that their counterparts usually bribe controllers 
whether their logging activities are legal or illegal. 92.2% of them believe that their colleagues know in advance 
the amount to be paid to bribe forest administrations. 98.2% of logging companies say that once the bribes are paid 
to forestry administrators, their counterparts receive the services they expected, especially in the administrative 
procedures for licensing or cancelling the offenses committed. The survey also reveals that 79.7% express the fear 
of logging companies bribing administrators in addition to what is known as normal bribes. 94.9% say that other 
operators must pay bribes in several stages leading to the completion of an administrative file. 86.7% believe that 
offending operators negotiate bribes with forest controllers in order to reduce or cancel the fine for this offense. 
Finally, all of them state that companies give bribes at police checkpoints to facilitate the transportation of their 
logs from the forests to processing plants, lumber yards or ports of shipment. 
Table 7: The penalty suffered by logging companies for bribery. 
(e, c) 
1’ 2’ 3’ 4’ 5’ Total 
A’ R A’ R A’ R A’ R A’ R A’ R 
Penalty for operator bribery 0 0 2 3.3 23 39 29 49.2 5 8.5 59 100 
Source: Our surveys. 
Table 7 shows that only 3.3% of logging companies believe that a logger can pay a penalty for bribing to a 
forest administrator. On the other hand, 57.7% deny the existence of such a penalty. Field data suggests that the 
forest management system regulator in Cameroon does not have the penalty (pg). The absence of such a penalty 
may appear as a significant explanatory factor for the wild exploitation of forests in this country, thus 
compromising the intergenerational balance in the management of forestry. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper was to provide, in the light of the Mookherjee and P'ng model, an alternative explanation 
to the crisis of sustainable forest management in Cameroon. Field data shows that bribery has profoundly affected 
the sustainable management of forestry. This phenomenon is highlighted in the bribery game between logging 
stakeholders, especially the couple (e, c). In its attempt to rationalize logging and thus preserve the 
intergenerational balance, MINEF does not have the management and control instruments proposed by the model: 
a reward rate (r) and a penalty rate (pt) aimed at getting public forest controllers to draw up objective and reliable 
forest degradation reports, a penalty rate (pg) aimed at dissuading logging companies from corrupting controllers. 
The absence of these instruments appears to be one of the fundamental causes of the crisis of sustainable forest 
management and its aggravation in the country. In terms of recommendation, it is advisable for MINEF to adopt 
and ensure the application of r, pt, and pg. However, the adoption and application of these instruments may not be 
enough to guarantee the end of this crisis as the financial greed of both logging companies and controllers can 
oppose to the clean-up of the forestry sector. The recommendation can go beyond the only instruments proposed 
by the model, by introducing a reward rate (r ') that would benefit the logging company that best respects the 
regulation about cutting trees. 
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